The COVID-19 virus was unveiled to the world as a health crisis and later also as an economic crisis. For some organisations, it has become an ethical crisis. This is certainly the case for large organisations in Australia, where the way many enterprises handled a government wage subsidy called JobKeeper led to a public backlash, media pressure, and a variety of responses ranging from ‘We acted legally’ to the full return of the subsidy. Some organisations later reported profits, and the (...) public response indicated concern about this behaviour, many considering it immoral despite it being legally compliant. It is, we contend, a question to which stakeholder theory can be applied, examining how organisations view and respond to the public. We use content analysis of mainstream media to provide information about public reactions and information from official sources to confirm corporate action. We show that there is a significant ethical component in the public response to the behaviour of organisations as they respond to the crisis. COVID has been an ethical, health, and financial crisis for these organisations. Public pressure, exerted in and through the media, made the general public a definite stakeholder. (shrink)

Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume’s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within (...) this epistemological model, we cannot attain complete certainty about the continuum but only at most about discrete quantity. Geometry, in contrast to arithmetic, cannot be a fully exact science. A number of more recent commentators have offered sympathetic interpretations of Hume’s discussion aiming to correct the older tendency to dismiss this part of the Treatise as weak and confused. Most of these commentators interpret Hume as anticipating the contemporary idea of a finite or discrete geometry. They view Hume’s conception that space is composed of simple indivisible minima as a forerunner of the conception that space is a discretely (rather than continuously) ordered set. This approach, in my view, is helpful as far as it goes, but there are several important features of Hume’s discussion that are not sufficiently appreciated. I go beyond these recent commentators by emphasizing three of Hume’s most original contributions. First, Hume’s epistemological model invokes the “confounding” of indivisible minima to explain the appearance of spatial continuity. Second, Hume’s sharp contrast between the perfect exactitude of arithmetic and the irremediable inexactitude of geometry reverses the more familiar conception of the early modern tradition in pure mathematics, according to which geometry (the science of continuous quantity) has its own standard of equality that is independent from and more exact than any corresponding standard supplied by algebra and arithmetic (the sciences of discrete quantity). Third, Hume has a developed explanation of how geometry (traditional Euclidean geometry) is nonetheless possible as an axiomatic demonstrative science possessing considerably more exactitude and certainty that the “loose judgements” of the vulgar. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to physically interpret the Modal Kochen–Specker theorem. In order to do so, we analyze the features of the possible properties of quantum systems arising from the elements in an orthomodular lattice and distinguish the use of “possibility” in the classical and quantum formalisms. Taking into account the modal and many worlds non-collapse interpretation of the projection postulate, we discuss how the MKS theorem rules the constraints to actualization, and thus, the relation between actual and possible (...) realms. (shrink)

Hume follows Newton in replacing the mechanical philosophy’s demonstrative ideal of science by the Principia’s ideal of inductive proof ; in this respect, Hume differs sharply from Locke. Hume is also guided by Newton’s own criticisms of the mechanical philosophers’ hypotheses. The first stage of Hume’s skeptical argument concerning causation targets central tenets of the mechanical philosophers’ conception of causation, all of which rely on the a priori postulation of a hidden configuration of primary qualities. The skeptical argument concerning the (...) causal inductive inference then raises doubts about what Hume himself regards as our very best inductive method. Hume’s own “Rules” further substantiate his reliance on Newton. Finally, Locke’s distinction between “Knowledge” and “Probability” does not leave room for Hume’s Newtonian notion of inductive proof. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 351-383 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Pyrrhonian Skepticism and the Belief in Causal Laws Graciela De Pierris Hume endorses in no uncertain terms the normative use of causal reasoning. The most striking example of this commitment is Hume's argument in the Enquiry against the possibility of miracles. The argument sanctions, in particular, the use of scientific reflection on uniform experience (...) issuing in causal laws of nature (E 114): "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." 1 These words should give us pause; for how can Hume so confidently say, after his skeptical conclusions concerning our causal beliefs, that "a firm and unalterable experience has established" the laws of nature, and that we can therefore produce "proofs" against miracles? The Treatise gives rise to the same puzzle. In this text, too, Hume confidently prescribes methodical reflection based on causal reasoning. For example, in Book One, Part Three, Section Fifteen, Hume offers eight "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects." These rules are more than descriptions of our natural causal inferences. They are meant to guide us in making better causal inferences; in Hume's words they "ought to regulate" our probable reasoning since (T 149): "by them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes." 2Moreover, Hume consistently takes Newtonian science as a model for the proper employment of causal inferences in inquiries into matters of fact and, [End Page 351] in particular, as a model to be followed in his own science of human nature. 3 This paradigm of what the science of nature ought to be is understood by Hume as an inductive, experimental inquiry. 4 In the Enquiry, for example, Hume uses the label "sciences" for "politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c." and in the preceding discussion argues that these sciences are not a priori but are based on causal reasoning (E 164-165). Thus, there are for Hume inquiries into matters of fact and existence that amount to more than blindly following natural propensities and habit. The sciences and many of our causal inferences in common life involve more than mere belief as a sentiment. They involve, in addition, careful reflection that results in improved causal inferences and thus provides normative standards. Yet, in thus upholding the normative use of causal reasoning in science and in everyday life, Hume appears to contradict his own radical skeptical conclusions concerning our knowledge of causation and induction. I here propose a novel way to resolve this puzzle.To acknowledge the existence of a puzzle, however, amounts to accepting the now controversial view that Hume provides, and takes at face value, a radical skeptical argument concerning our knowledge of causation and induction. 5 Moreover, the attempt to resolve this puzzle involves rejecting the suggestion [End Page 352] that Hume, without awareness or concern, happily holds flatly inconsistent views. 6 It also goes against the more sophisticated suggestion that Hume lightly alternates among different psychological moods, or perhaps different perspectives, which might eventually issue in results that contradict each other but are sufficiently localized so as to prevent serious conflict. Such a view might lead us to conceive Hume's texts as an unstructured and arbitrary patchwork of reflections, driven by different psychological moods or by the embellishments of a radiant literary style. This kind of reading is unacceptable as an interpretative tool, however, as H. J. Paton has acutely noted in his criticism of the patchwork interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 7 For such a reading would place no constraints at all on the task of establishing which parts of Hume's text belong to which moods or perspectives. The suggestion that Hume offers an unstructured patchwork of reflections masks the novel and systematic distinction Hume draws between his radical philosophical... (shrink)

By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume’s radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume’s perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume‘s (...) radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume’s naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume’s two “definitions” of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation---Norman Kemp Smith’s and Annette Baier’s, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin’s, on the other---that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume. (shrink)

The modem rationalist tradition initiated by Descartes has as one of its central tenets the independence of the human understanding from the senses. Regardless of the different ways in which independence from experience is understood, there is much common ground among the modem views on the a priori. Yet Kant, culminating this tradition, introduces an entirely new conception of the a priori never before articulated in the history of philosophy. This is the notion of elements in knowledge which are independent (...) of experience but nevertheless closely connected, in a special way, with experience.Although for Kant the a priori has a privileged position in the structure of knowledge - as it has for other modem rationalist philosophers - one of the most striking, and often neglected, aspect of his conception of the a priori is the great extent to which it is opposed to foundationalism. (shrink)

Este trabajo se ocupa de la crítica de Platón a oradores, poetas y sofistas. Su propósito es mostrar que independientemente de las características que singularizan una batalla de vasto alcance librada por el filósofo en tres frentes distintos, la noción de imitación (mimesis) proporciona un hilo conductor que permite vincular esos diferentes enfrentamientos y arrojar luz sobre la reacción de Platón ante quienes identifica, peyorativamente, como imitadores. La práctica adulatoria del orador en Gorgias, no menos que el quehacer del poeta (...) puesto en tela de juicio en República y el del sofista en el diálogo homónimo tendrían, en efecto, una naturaleza mimética. Esto no impide reconocer, junto a los puntos de continuidad, diferencias significativas en los tratamientos de la mimesis que ofrecen los tres diálogos aquí considerados. (shrink)

El derecho a migrar, como el derecho a la salud del migrante, se encuentran reconocidos en la Ley de Migraciones Nro. 25871/2003 de Argentina. Dicha ley constituye un avance legislativo en derechos humanos; resultado de un largo proceso constituyente, deliberativo, que dio lugar a un modelo inclusivo de migración sin precedentes internacionales en su momento. Sin embargo, recientemente asistimos a un giro en políticas migratorias (DNU 70/2017). Como consecuencia, se produce un retroceso en derechos sociales y políticos. En lo que (...) hace al derecho a la salud, la instauración de políticas neoconservadoras (Cobertura Universal de la Salud –CUS-) impulsó leyes provinciales (Ley 6119/2019) destinadas a exigir seguros pagos de salud para migrantes, contrarios a nuestra constitución. El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar las raíces de éstos cambios en las normativas citadas sobre migraciones y salud; aplicando un marco de justicia social que nos permita comprender, críticamente, cómo la bifurcación de políticas distributivas y de reconocimiento en las mismas legislaciones habilitó el desarrollo de políticas neoconservadoras impuestas a través de decretos autoritarios; cuyas consecuencias trascienden la esfera de los migrantes, haciendo peligrar al mismo sistema de salud argentino como bien público. (shrink)

The objective of the work is to analyze the intersectional discriminations that operate in the multiple identities of regional migrant women in the field of health in Argentina during the present pandemic. We will begin with the critical study of key categories and the origin of the inequalities of law of the aforementioned discrimination in migration policies. Second, we will address de facto inequalities, particularly examining the socio-economic inequalities suffered by migrants during the pandemic. Thirdly, in order to enable alternative (...) forms of care and self-care from the recognition of their ethnicity and the inseparable care of the earth, we propose the application of the concept of territorial participatory justice as a condition of intercultural dialogue in health. As a proposal, it seeks to promote dialogues of knowledge located outside the bureaucratic councils and expanding the social base of health rights from the pluriculturality exercised in care networks of migrant women in the territory and not from their domesticated participation. (shrink)

"Epistemology Naturalized" has been extremely influential among contemporary analytical epistemologists. Current discussions about Quine's thesis do not pay attention to a basic point: his main argument is a historical one. Quine tries to show that a naturalized epistemology is the best way out vis-a-vis the failures of traditional epistemology. In this paper, I argue that Quine's argument is based on a fictions historical account. lf that is the case, his reasons for a naturalizcd epistemology are non-sutficient.

By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume’s radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume’s perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume‘s (...) radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume’s naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume’s two “definitions” of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation---Norman Kemp Smith’s and Annette Baier’s, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin’s, on the other---that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume. (shrink)

Introducción al Dossier "Bioética después de la COVID-19. Derecho a la salud y garantía de bienes públicos en el contexto post-pandemia".

The aim of this paper will focus on the ethical analysis of the general problem of international responsibility in the protection of public goods in pandemics, taking as a paradigmatic case the access to the COVID vaccine. Our hypothesis revolves around showing the international responsibility for damage in the access and distribution of the aforementioned vaccine, evidencing how this "covert privatization of public goods" rests on an unjustified patent system that generates the continuity of the pandemic and the speculative trade (...) of prices. This system extends to the network of public goods essential to the health of our populations. The methodology chosen consists of a critical study of patent law and the ethics and political analysis of international liability for damages applied to the pandemic situation. The paper is divided into four sections. First, the origin of the COVID vaccine will be analyzed, establishing its character as a public good. Secondly, it will investigate the conflict between patents and the human right to health from the TRIPS Agreement, questioning the patent system. Thirdly, the philosophical arguments raised by Pogge against TRIPS will be examined, using them for the analysis of the abuse of dominant power of developed countries at the distribution level. Fourthly, as an alternative proposal, some theoretical guidelines will be outlined, inspired by a redefined concept of "social connection", but applied to affected groups and countries with violated rights. It will be proposed to strengthen collective and participatory actions for the protection of public goods and the development of open science, technological and sanitary sovereignty, from the integral care of health and under a human rights framework with a gender perspective. This topic deserves to be deepened in future research. (shrink)

I wish to discuss in this paper some of the problems involved in determining whether subjects on particular occasions are justified in coming to believe a proposition. I will argue that in attributing actual justification to a particular subject–subjective justification–we have to take into account factual-psychological questions and that these are the source of fundamental difficulties. These factual-psychological questions concern the beliefs someone uses in the process of acquiring another belief and the actual connections she makes among her beliefs.But why (...) should epistemologists be interested in making attributions of actual justification to particular subjects? After all, if the central goal of epistemology is to guide us in choosing rational strategies for supporting our beliefs, or to assess whether theories are well grounded or acceptable, epistemologists should be concerned with the justification a theory or proposition might have independently of anyone actually coming to believe it. This may be so, but it has to be shown that it is so. Moreover, the consideration of the factual-psychological questions involved in attributions of subjective justification seems to be necessary in some recent hybrid forms of naturalized epistemology. I call them ‘hybrid’ because, unlike Quine’s naturalized epistemology, they include in the epistemological task more than naturalistic explanations of how we acquire our language and beliefs. Besides taking into consideration the actual processes of our coming to believe or accept sentences, they also make use of epistemic notions like justification, warrant, relevant or right connection among beliefs, and so forth. (shrink)

Introducción al Dosier: Ética, derechos humanos, migraciones y salud.

I wish to discuss in this paper some of the problems involved in determining whether subjects on particular occasions are justified in coming to believe a proposition. I will argue that in attributing actual justification to a particular subject–subjective justification–we have to take into account factual-psychological questions and that these are the source of fundamental difficulties. These factual-psychological questions concern the beliefs someone uses in the process of acquiring another belief and the actual connections she makes among her beliefs.But why (...) should epistemologists be interested in making attributions of actual justification to particular subjects? After all, if the central goal of epistemology is to guide us in choosing rational strategies for supporting our beliefs, or to assess whether theories are well grounded or acceptable, epistemologists should be concerned with the justification a theory or proposition might have independently of anyone actually coming to believe it. This may be so, but it has to be shown that it is so. Moreover, the consideration of the factual-psychological questions involved in attributions of subjective justification seems to be necessary in some recent hybrid forms of naturalized epistemology. I call them ‘hybrid’ because, unlike Quine’s naturalized epistemology, they include in the epistemological task more than naturalistic explanations of how we acquire our language and beliefs. Besides taking into consideration the actual processes of our coming to believe or accept sentences, they also make use of epistemic notions like justification, warrant, relevant or right connection among beliefs, and so forth. (shrink)

En este artículo realizaremos una lectura crítica de la teoría de la dominación propuesta por Bourdieu en el capítulo octavo de El sentido práctico, titulado “Los modos de dominación”. Allí se distinguen con claridad dos modos de dominación: la violencia abierta y la violencia simbólica, aseguradas en su reproducción por el pasaje de las relaciones interpersonales en “la sociedad tradicional” a la institucionalización vía mecanismos objetivos en la sociedad capitalista. En ese sentido, mostraremos continuidades y diferencias relativas a la versión (...) inicial de esta teoría presente en La reproducción, y, luego, propondremos una revisión crítica de esta teoría y de la distinción, tan clásica como problemática, entre objetividad y subjetividad con el propósito de contribuir al desarrollo de una fenomenología social de la dominación con fundamento en la obra de Bourdieu. (shrink)

En este artículo realizaremos una lectura crítica de la teoría de la dominación propuesta por Bourdieu en el capítulo octavo de El sentido práctico, titulado “Los modos de dominación”. Allí se distinguen con claridad dos modos de dominación: la violencia abierta y la violencia simbólica, aseguradas en su reproducción por el pasaje de las relaciones interpersonales en “la sociedad tradicional” a la institucionalización vía mecanismos objetivos en la sociedad capitalista. En ese sentido, mostraremos continuidades y diferencias relativas a la versión (...) inicial de esta teoría presente en La reproducción, y, luego, propondremos una revisión crítica de esta teoría y de la distinción, tan clásica como problemática, entre objetividad y subjetividad con el propósito de contribuir al desarrollo de una fenomenología social de la dominación con fundamento en la obra de Bourdieu. (shrink)

La noción de sistema de equivalencias adquiere en la fenomenología merleaupon-tyana un lugar central, puesto que allí subyace una función general de transposición tácita. Se trata de un principio de comprensión sin explicación analógica, una síntesis sin análisis, tal como puede observarse, por ejemplo, en la plasticidad, la transferi-bilidad y la analogicidad que caracteriza a los hábitos. Sobre esta base, este artículo seguirá un camino regresivo a fin de desvelar que el sentido de las equivalencias y transposiciones está latente en (...) "las matrices simbólicas", que ofrecen una clave para comprender que los fenómenos de expresión, que tienen lugar en el mundo a través del cuerpo, del lenguaje, de la historia y del arte, deben ser vistos como nudos, emblemas de sentido en los que se hace visible una dimensión temporal. Las matrices simbólicas son "centros organizadores" y, por lo tanto, "centros de significación" que se retoman una y otra vez. The notion of a system of equivalences comes to have in Merleau-Ponty's phe-nomenology a central place because lying under there is a general function of tacit transposition. It is a principle for understanding without analogical explanation, i.e., a synthesis without analysis, as can be seen, for example, in the plasticity, transferability, and likeliness that characterizes habits. On this basis, the article will follow a regres-sive way in order to show that the meaning of the equivalences and transpositions is latent in "the symbolic matrixes" that offer a clue to understand that the phenomena of expression, which occur in the world by means of the body, language, history, and art, should be seen as nodes or emblems of meaning in which a temporal dimension shows itself. Symbolic matrixes are "organizing centers", and thus "centers of signi-ficance" that are taken up over and over again. (shrink)

En este trabajo realizo un examen crítico del reciente libro de Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo sobre la crítica de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de las Ideas. El libro de Di Camillo es un trabajo muy serio cuya lectura recomiendo ampliamente. Sin embargo, considero que cuatro de las principales tesis que la autora defiende tienen varias dificultades y mi objetivo aquí es presentar argumentos detallados en contra de ellas: la interpretación de la distinción entre argumentos más y menos rigurosos del (...) tratado Sobre las Ideas; la tesis de que la separación es el blanco esencial de las críticas aristotélicas a las Ideas; la interpretación de las opciones que Platón tiene para responder al argumento del tercer hombre, y la tesis de que la separación de las Ideas debe entenderse como homonimia. In this paper I examine Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo's recent book on Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's theory of Ideas. Di Camillo's book is a very serious work that I highly recommend. Nevertheless, I consider that four of the main theses that the author defends face several difficulties and my aim here is to offer detailed arguments against them: the interpretation of the distinction between more and less accurate arguments of the treatise On Ideas; the thesis that separation is the essential target of Aristotle's criticisms against Plato's Ideas; the interpretation of the options available to Plato to reply to the third man argument; and the thesis that the separation of Ideas should be understood as homonymy. (shrink)

El artículo tiene como finalidad justificar por qué es importante incluir las pedagogías propias de los pueblos originarios en los programas de formación docente de educación básica a nivel nacional, como valores compartidos de su patrimonio cultural tangible e intangible. Este patrimonio cultural es el pilar histórico de México, que por supuesto no se encuentra sólo en los pueblos originarios, sino que responde a un proceso histórico social determinado de la nación y que, a pesar de la conquista europea, siguió (...) prevaleciendo en las pedagogías y valores propios de los pueblos originarios. Proponemos cristalizar estos patrimonios culturales de los pueblos originarios para ser considerados como pedagogías propias en los programas de formación docente y desde este campo de formación compartir los valores culturales a través de sus saberes, sabidurías y prácticas culturales que han prevalecido a lo largo de la historia y que den cuenta en los planes y programas de estudio con igualdad y equidad cultural en el Sistema Educativo Nacional. Asimismo, se exponen los procesos de contradicción que los pueblos originarios han vivido y han asumido a lo largo de las políticas educativas dirigidas a la educación indígena. Finalmente, se plantean algunas consideraciones para estos programas de formación docente. (shrink)